our intelligence gathering assets and focus our firepower within a specific area.

The G-3 Air, ALO, and division targeting officer maintained the kill box overlay, which identified areas to be serviced by both indirect artillery and air support. The overlay kept the targeting officer abreast of the locations on which CAS sorties would be focused, and this simplified the development of SEAD fire missions. The ALO informed the targeting officer of the expected TOTs, and the targeting officer timed SEAD fires to hit before these CAS TOTs. General support artillery—after coordination with the division fire support element, the G-3 Air, and the ALO—then executed the attacks against the enemy air defenses.

The coordinating agencies for massed fires remained the same, the only difference being that lateral separation instead of timed separation would be used to prevent conflicts between artillery and CAS sorties.

The ability to coordinate CAS and indirect fires on a specific kill box greatly improved the synchronization of fires; it also simplified the acquisition of targets, the massing of fires, and the protection of CAS assets. As a result, the division established these techniques as standing operating procedure.

The effective coordination of the 2d Infantry Division's artillery and close air support greatly contributed to its warfighting capability and its success during Warfighter '92.

Captain William S. McCallister, an infantry officer, completed the U.S. Air Force's Battle Staff Course and Joint Firepower Controllers Course and served as the G-3 Air, 2d Infantry Division in Korea. He now commands a company in the division's 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry. He is a 1983 ROTC graduate of Wright State University.

Captain Douglas P. Schaare, a U.S. Air Force pilot, is the 2d Infantry Division air liaison officer and has also completed the Joint Firepower Controllers Course. He is a 1988 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy.

The Battalion XO

Leader, Coordinator, Trainer, Logistician

COLONEL COLE C. KINGSEED

The executive officer in an infantry battalion has always played an important, but frequently misunderstood, role. Most infantrymen are familiar with the XO's traditional "beans and bullets" duties, but any commander who limits his XO's responsibilities to these functions fails to take advantage of the experience this field grade officer brings to the command.

Before I left my last command, a young major asked me what advice I would give to a newly assigned executive officer and what I would expect of him. Having commanded a light infantry battalion, and having served as executive officer at company, battalion, and brigade levels, I would like to outline my response to these questions. For the sake of clarity, I have organized my remarks into four general areas:

Battalion Second-in-Command (2IC). As the senior major in the battalion, the executive officer has a role as the battalion's second-in-command (or 2IC as the British term it) and must be ready to assume that duty in the commander's absence. This is the XO's most important function and one for which he can readily train. Still, a few words of caution are in order.

Although the XO is the second most senior officer in the battalion, he is not the commander. He should therefore respect and support the company commanders' right to talk directly to the battalion commander. Granted, the relationship between the XO and the subordinate commanders varies from one command to another. The XO serves a better purpose, however, if he can ensure that the battalion commander's directives are implemented without antagonizing the company commanders or interfering with their ability to command their respective units.

The most effective executive officers I have encountered in more than 20 years of service have been those who developed a healthy professional relationship with the subordinate commanders. Company commanders often use the XO as a sounding board for their training concepts before they approach the battalion commander directly. Although many issues can be settled only through green-tab channels, just as often these same issues can be approached indirectly through the XO—especially if the XO and the battalion commander have established a good rapport.

Frequently, the XO will assume temporary command in the battalion commander's absence. In these instances, the

gets—in effect, to deny the enemy access into the close battle area. These targets consisted of enemy artillery concentrations, surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and brigade or battalion-sized mechanized infantry or armor formations.

One of the division's deep strike options was to nominate targets for air interdiction (AI) sorties. This method worked when servicing targets well beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL), but two problems arose in trying to attack targets that were a more immediate threat to the division, yet still somewhat beyond the FSCL.

First, AI sorties required a lengthy nomination process. To get an AI sortie approved and listed on the integrated tasking order, we had to nominate targets almost two days before the requested time over target (TOT). For an AI sortie on ground alert, the process took at least four to six hours. Neither of these options was responsive enough to meet the rapidly changing battlefield requirements.

The second problem also arose from the nomination process. Since all AI sorties are controlled and approved at the air component command level, we had no guarantee that our nominated targets would be approved and subsequently attacked. We therefore determined that the only weapons that could meet our immediate requirements were the division's CAS sorties and indirect fire systems.

The 2d Division continued to nominate AI missions, some of which were approved and flown effectively. In addition, however, we directed CAS sorties to support the division's deep battle. This "deep CAS" provided a responsive and much needed force multiplier, but the use of CAS in a deep role raised an important question: How deep is deep?

Obviously, positive control is required for CAS missions close to friendly forces, but this control is not required during CAS missions out to and beyond the FSCL. The biggest concern for any use of CAS beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT) is the coordination of the Army's indirect fire weapons with Air Force's CAS assets to safeguard the aircraft against long range, high angle artillery fires. With this in mind, the division was able to formulate a concept for defining what *deep* really meant.

The division requested CAS to attack targets out to the effective range of the division's multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). By moving our MLRS forward, as the situation dictated, we could provide effective suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Thus, the requirement was for CAS sorties to attack targets up to and beyond the FSCL.

To provide effective SEAD, we adopted an old technique, the kill box. We wanted to strike the enemy deep and protect our fighters while still remaining flexible enough to be able to mass both artillery and CAS fires to stop an enemy penetration or threat to our flanks. Aircraft could engage enemy targets within the box with a measure of protection against enemy air defenses and with the assurance they would not be endangered by friendly fire.

The kill box served two functions: When CAS was required to attack artillery concentrations, SSMs, or mechanized infantry and armor formations, the kill box could also function as a SEAD box. Avoiding conflict between artillery and CAS would consist of a timed separation over the target area to allow CAS sorties to strike after the artillery had attacked the known and templated enemy air defense weapons. When the division needed immediate fires, the SEAD box and timed separation of artillery and CAS over the target area would revert to a kill box and lateral separation.

The creation of kill boxes was prompted by the targeting process. The targeting method of decide-detect-deliver specified *what* targets should be acquired and attacked, *when* they should be acquired and attacked, and *which* specific requirements had to be met to defeat a target.

A short summary of the targeting process is in order: High-value targets (HVTs) consist of the assets that the enemy commander must have for the successful completion of his mission, and that are identified by the friendly G-2 and passed to the division deep targeting cell. This cell—chaired by the chief of staff and consisting of the deputy fire support coordinator, G-2, G-3, division aviation officer, electronic warfare officer, air liaison officer (ALO), and G-3 Air—determines which HVTs will be attacked to make the most of tactical air's contribution to the success of friendly operations. The HVTs that are considered important to the overall success of the friendly commander's scheme of maneuver are designated high-payoff targets (HPTs).

During the exercise, the positioning of the kill boxes was based on the latest intelligence preparation of the battlefield. the analysis of probable enemy avenues of approach, and the expected scheme of maneuver. We designated kill boxes measuring three kilometers square in those areas where concentrations of HPTs would be expected. The restrictive Korean terrain in which the division operated offered a number of areas bounded by steep mountains that created natural obstacles to channel or concentrate selected threat targets. In addition, the terrain allowed us to direct



XO should command the battalion as he believes the commander would—not as he would if he were, in fact, permanently in command. This is particularly important with respect to the soldiers—in matters relating to non-judicial punishment, recommendations for awards, and the like. Consistency with the commander's policies eliminates confusion from the perspectives of the soldiers and the junior officers and can earn the support of subordinate commanders.

A smart commander trains his principal subordinate to command the battalion both in the field and in garrison. While conducting tactical operations, he should let the XO command the unit for one mission during each battalion field exercise. This should include planning as well as executing the mission. Instead of looking over the XO's shoulder, the commander should offer his comments in an after-action-review format after each phase of the operation. An executive officer at any level will learn more from this experience than he will from a dozen exercises in which he confines himself to the support role or limits himself to staff coordination. More important, the experience of commanding a battalion in the field builds confidence and greatly improves the readiness of the command by ensuring that the XO is tactically and technically able to assume command.

Involving the executive officer in special operations also trains him for eventual battalion command. While doctrine assigns certain functions to the XO—such as serving as a crossing area commander in river-crossing operations—he might also command and control aircraft in air assault operations when the commander and the S-3 deploy with the initial companies. If the battalion commander is already in contact, the executive officer is far better able to make critical decisions concerning bump plans, changing landing zones, and possibly redirecting ground formations than an assistant staff officer would be.

Staff Coordination. Another important function of the XO is staff coordination, which has important implications at both battalion and brigade level. Within the battalion, the executive officer, as the most experienced staff officer, should be fully knowledgeable of all staff functions and the decision making process. The XO should be expected to coordinate and train the staff in all staff procedures and functions, both in the field and in garrison. His ability to function as a chief of staff and serve as the single point of contact for staff guidance, coordination, and conflict resolution is vital to the efficient operation of the battalion. This is particularly true when the individual staff sections get too wrapped up in their respective areas of responsibility.

Because of their youth and inexperience, staff members—including the operations officer—often tend to concentrate their efforts in their own areas and ignore that function's relationship to the overall operation of the battalion as a combat-ready force. Only the executive officer can ensure that each staff member understands the interplay involved in making sound and timely recommendations to the commander. I found the best way to accomplish this was to ensure that the staff took no shortcuts in the command and staff decision making process that culminates, for the staff officer, in a coordinated staff recommendation to the battalion commander.

Nowhere is staff coordination more important than in a tactical environment. The XO must ensure that he is intimately familiar with all tactical operations so that he can assume command of the battalion if necessary and so he can provide timely logistical support to subordinate units. An XO who spends all his time in the trains will never know how the companies are faring and will not be able to anticipate tactical and logistical problems. Neither will he be abreast of the tactical situation in the event he



has to assume command.

Outside the battalion, the XO is also the primary liaison officer to senior headquarters. As a battalion XO, I made a practice of visiting the brigade's primary staff officers for direct coordination at least twice a month. I also paid the brigade XO a monthly office call. These meetings were always at my insistence. Sometimes we had a specific agenda; other times, I wanted his perception of how the battalion was supporting the brigade commander. Not only did I get to know all the staff counterparts on a personal basis, but the battalion was never surprised by a brigade inspection during my tenure as XO. I attribute this solely to the fact that I knew about impending staff actions and which areas the brigade commander intended to emphasize. As a result, the battalion met most brigade requirements before brigade orders and directives were issued.

Within the battalion, the battalion XO can play an even more important role in providing staff support to the company commanders and XOs. Periodic visits to company commanders and XOs can greatly improve the rapport and unit esprit that contribute to battalion readiness. Ensuring that commanders receive timely copies of briefing charts for command and staff meetings, and the latest materiel readiness and training reports to facilitate the briefings to the battalion commander, will prevent an adversarial relationship between the company commanders and the battalion staff members. Such relationships are always detrimental to battalion readiness.

Another method of helping subordinate commanders and training the staff at the same time is to develop a comprehensive command inspection program. A workable inspection program, supervised by the XO and conducted by the staff, not only ensures that the companies are prepared for brigade and division level inspections, but also gives the XO an instrument for evaluating the staff members on procedures and on their expertise in their respective areas of responsibility.

Battalion Trainer. Aside from training the primary and special staff officers to function as an integral part of the battalion, the XO should also direct his efforts to another group of officers—the company XOs, for whom he has a special responsibility. Training junior executive officers is an important function because it contributes to the success of their companies and ultimately of the battalion, and it enables the junior leaders to become effective company commanders.

I strongly recommend that a battalion XO meet with his company counterparts at least once a week as a group and just as often individually. These meetings might be held in the battalion XO's office, the battalion motor pool, the unit dining facility, or a company supply room, arms room, or communications room on a rotating basis. These meetings—in addition to coordinating support for the respective company commanders—can also serve as officer professional development sessions. What better way to discuss materiel readiness issues, the battalion command inspection program, or the battalion commander's current focus?

In addition to training the company XOs, the battalion XO also has an obligation to support the headquarters company commander's training program. Too often, the staff misses physical training sessions and other mandatory training in preparing for quarterly training briefs, command and staff meetings, and the like. By doing morning PT with the headquarters company or a rifle company or qualifying with his individual weapon on the range, the XO not only sets the example for the rest of the staff but also demonstrates the importance he attaches to maintaining combat readiness and physical fitness.

Materiel Readiness. The XO is traditionally the battalion's materiel readiness officer and the most visible point of contact for all logistical matters. As a result, he must be fully knowledgeable of all issues related to logistics. Frequently, he must run high-level interference when support agencies have brushed junior officers aside. He must not be reluctant to use his rank and position when necessary to demand quality support for the battalion. The extent to which he becomes personally involved may determine how timely the support is. It has been my experience, however, that support agencies are just as willing to support combat units as the combat units are to be supported. What is often lacking is coordination between the two commands.

By scheduling periodic meetings between unit XOs and the commissioned and noncommissioned officers of support units, the XO can ensure that support is available to the battalion and that the companies pick up work orders as soon as their equipment is repaired. He can also check to see that unserviceable equipment is submitted for repair as soon as it is broken and that radios, vehicles, and weapons are not down any longer than necessary.

The battalion executive officer is also the principal logistical representative to the brigade and division headquarters. Close coordination with senior staffs, such as scheduling courtesy maintenance assistance inspection team (MAIT) visits, will result in improved support for the battalion. As the battalion's senior logistician, he can address most logistical issues authoritatively, preventing, or at least mitigating, any potential embarrassment for the battalion commander and, by extension, for the S-4. Moreover, the XO can eliminate additional logistical problems by fostering a professional relationship with other battalion XOs and di-

vision special staff officers—such as the inspector general and the G-4 action officers.

Whether functioning as the second-in-command, the staff coordinator, the staff trainer, or the materiel readiness officer, the XO can make a valuable contribution to the overall combat readiness of a battalion. Both aspiring executive officers and battalion commanders might think of the XO as not only the battalion commander's right-hand man but also as the company commanders' chief supporter. When the XO functions in this twin capacity, the result will be an effective and efficient team.

Colonel Cole C. Kingseed commanded the 4th Battalion, 87th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division and is now assigned to the faculty at the United States Military Academy. He is a 1971 ROTC graduate of the University of Dayton and holds a doctorate from Ohio State University.



FIFTY YEARS AGO IN WORLD WAR II
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1943

In the autumn of 1943 the German offensive in Russia had lost its momentum. Major battles, such as at Kursk in July, had inflicted heavy losses in men and materiel. In the Pacific, Japanese dreams of conquest now lay in the wreckage of their ships, planes, and installations. In Italy, Mussolini's vision of glory had been replaced by the reality of Allied forces landing at Sicily, Naples, Salerno, and Tarento. None of these gains would have been possible without the sacrifices made by the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of the United States and her Allies.

These and other highlights of World War II are drawn from Bud Hannings' A Portrait of the Stars and Stripes, Volume II (available for $50.00 from Seniram Publishing, Inc., P.O. Box 432, Glenside, PA 19038).

1 September — *Admiral Chester W. Nimitz receives orders to seize Wake, Eniwetok, and Kusaie Is lands after the ongoing invasion of the Marshall Islands is completed.*

5 September — *U.S. pilots shoot down 41 Japanese fighters as an Australian-American force captures Lae, New Guinea.*

9 September — *The invasion of Italy commences with Lieutenant General Mark Clark's Fifth Army landing on the beaches south of Naples, in the face of stiff German and Italian resistance. Despite enemy counterattacks, the beachhead holds.*

11 September — *In the Solomon Islands, a new weapon, the 4.2-inch mortar, is used for the first time. Its increased range and effectiveness provide commanders with even more responsive, devastating indirect fire support.*

13 September — *When his platoon is pinned down by intense German fire east of Naples, Corporal Charles E. Kelly, Company I, 143d Infantry, mans a machinegun and returns fire until out of ammunition. He then pulls the safety pins out of 60mm mortar shells and throws them as grenades. Finally, using a rocket launcher, Corporal Kelly succeeds in holding the enemy at bay. His heroism and spirit are later recognized when he receives the Medal of Honor.*

1 October — *Naples falls to British and American forces.*

8 October — *Elements of the 30th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, attack across the Volturno River near Amorosi in pursuit of withdrawing German forces and establish a bridgehead.*

17 October — *Major Gregory "Pappy" Boyington's Marine Fighter Squadron 214 shoots down 20 Japanese fighters at Kahili, in the Solomon Islands, without losing a single aircraft.*

23 October — *The U.S. 133d Infantry, 34th Infantry Division, captures San Angelo d'Alife in Italy after facing heavy resistance on the preceding day.*

30 October — *U.S. Marines complete preparations for the invasion of Bougainville, Solomon Islands.*